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background
From June 22 through June 25, 2009, four outbreaks of infection with the pandemic 
influenza A (H1N1) virus occurred in Singapore military camps. We report the effi-
cacy of ring chemoprophylaxis (geographically targeted containment by means of 
prophylaxis) with oseltamivir to control outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 influenza in semi-
closed environments.
Methods
All personnel with suspected infection were tested and clinically isolated if infection 
was confirmed. In addition, we administered postexposure ring chemoprophylaxis 
with oseltamivir and segregated the affected military units to contain the spread of the 
virus. All personnel were screened three times weekly both for virologic infection, by 
means of nasopharyngeal swabs and reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction 
assay with sequencing, and for clinical symptoms, by means of questionnaires.
Results
A total of 1175 personnel were at risk across the four sites, with 1100 receiving osel-
tamivir prophylaxis. A total of 75 personnel (6.4%) were infected before the inter-
vention, and 7 (0.6%) after the intervention. There was a significant reduction in the 
overall reproductive number (the number of new cases attributable to the index 
case), from 1.91 (95% credible interval, 1.50 to 2.36) before the intervention to 0.11 
(95% credible interval, 0.05 to 0.20) after the intervention. Three of the four out-
breaks showed a significant reduction in the rate of infection after the intervention. 
Molecular analysis revealed that all four outbreaks were derived from the New York 
lineage of the 2009 H1N1 virus and that cases within each outbreak were due to trans-
mission rather than unrelated episodes of infection. Of the 816 personnel treated 
with oseltamivir who were surveyed, 63 (7.7%) reported mild, nonrespiratory side ef-
fects of the drug, with no severe adverse events.
Conclusions
Oseltamivir ring chemoprophylaxis, together with prompt identification and isola-
tion of infected personnel, was effective in reducing the impact of outbreaks of 2009 
H1N1 influenza in semiclosed settings.
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The 2009 pandemic influenza A (h1n1) virus has spread rapidly worldwide, despite initial attempts at containment through 
screening, isolation, and quarantine.1-3 Many coun-
tries moved rapidly into the mitigation phase after 
the outbreak was detected, which affected essen-
tial services, especially in the health and education 
sectors. Mexico, the first country affected, shut 
down all major public services for a week to halt 
transmission of the virus. Other large outbreaks 
in population centers had a similar effect on es-
sential services. Even though pandemic vaccines 
are available, the lack of availability during a pan-
demic results in incomplete global protection.
Mathematical models of the efficacy of con-
tainment measures in an influenza epicenter have 
been described,4,5 although these measures ulti-
mately proved ineffective at preventing the spread 
of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus. However, con-
tainment measures may be effective within spe-
cific closed environments, such as schools, health 
care settings, or military installations, all of which 
have a high risk of transmission.6 Chemoprophy-
laxis with a neuraminidase inhibitor has been ef-
fective in preventing the household transmission 
of influenza,7 and modeling studies have predicted 
that well-timed chemoprophylaxis could signifi-
cantly reduce the rate of absenteeism among 
health care workers due to illness, to maintain 
business continuity.8
Although antiviral “ring chemoprophylaxis” 
strategies (aimed at geographically targeted con-
tainment by means of prophylaxis) were predicted 
to be effective in mathematical models, data are 
needed to document their actual effectiveness dur-
ing a pandemic. We therefore describe our expe-
rience in responding to four outbreaks of the 2009 
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus in military 
camps (including one in a health care setting) and 
evaluate the role of oseltamivir “ring chemopro-
phylaxis” in attenuating transmission of the virus.
Me thods
Singapore is a city–state of 4.84 million people.9 
All Singaporean men perform 2 years of military 
service after high school, at 18 to 19 years of age. 
Most military personnel live in barracks-style ac-
commodations on weekdays and return home on 
weekends, resulting in an interaction between the 
military community and the Singapore population.
Singapore identified its first imported case of 
infection with the 2009 pandemic influenza A 
(H1N1) virus on May 27, 2009,10 and the first 
transmission to the local community was reported 
on June 18, 2009.11 In line with World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) recommendations,12 Singapore 
began the transition to mitigation on July 1, 
2009.13 The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) iden-
tified its first imported case of infection on June 
15, 2009, and its first four outbreak clusters (out-
breaks I, II, III, and IV) involving local transmis-
sion from June 22 to 25, 2009.
National Protocols and Management
A suspected case of 2009 H1N1 influenza was 
defined as influenza-like illness (temperature 
≥38.0°C with cough or sore throat) with an onset 
of symptoms within 7 days after travel to an af-
fected area, close contact with a person with con-
firmed infection, or contact with a local cluster of 
infected persons.14 Laboratory confirmation of sus-
pected cases was performed by means of real-time 
reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction 
(RT-PCR) assay or viral culture.14
Until July 1, 2009, all persons with suspected 
infection with the 2009 H1N1 virus were screened 
with the use of RT-PCR assay, according to na-
tional protocols,15 and patients with confirmed 
infection were isolated in hospitals to prevent 
transmission. Contact tracing was performed to 
identify close contacts, defined as persons who 
had had unprotected exposure, within 2 m, to an 
infected patient for 1 hour or more since the day 
before the onset of symptoms.10 Most contacts 
were quarantined at home for a 7-day period.
SAF Protocol and Management
Performing its function as a critical national re-
source, the SAF implemented additional interven-
tions to contain the spread of the 2009 H1N1 
virus. Primarily, “ring prophylaxis” with oseltam-
ivir (Tamiflu, Roche), at a dose of 75 mg daily, 
was administered to coworkers of the patient 
with confirmed infection for a period of 10 days 
after exposure.16 The oseltamivir had been pur-
chased and stockpiled several years previously as 
part of the SAF influenza-pandemic preparedness 
plan. A coworker was defined as a member of the 
same military unit, where contact opportunities 
were substantial even if they did not fulfill the 
Singapore Ministry of Health criteria for close 
contact. This wider definition was prompted by 
difficulties in identifying actual contacts and the 
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practicalities of rapidly administering prophylaxis. 
Larger prophylaxis rings were instituted if cases 
were present in multiple units. In addition, inter-
actions between affected units and other units 
were reduced within the camp, by allocating to 
each unit different times of arrival, departure, and 
meal delivery.
Epidemiologic Investigation
Our investigation of the outbreaks was approved 
by the SAF Joint Medical Committee, as well as the 
National University of Singapore and the Austra-
lian National University institutional review boards. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all 
persons for whom follow-up nasopharyngeal swabs 
were obtained, and oral assent was provided by 
all others during the surveys.
The four outbreaks occurred in different loca-
tions: one in each of three military units and one 
at a camp medical center. All personnel with sus-
pected infection were tested and isolated in the 
hospital if the test was positive. In addition, all 
asymptomatic personnel in the same unit were 
screened through the collection of nasopharyngeal 
swabs, three times a week, to detect subclinical 
infections.17 A written questionnaire was admin-
istered at each screening visit, as well as after the 
completion of prophylaxis, to collect data on de-
mographic characteristics, medical history, activ-
ity patterns, and clinical symptoms. Screening was 
performed until no additional cases were identi-
fied for 3 days after the last previously identified 
case or after the end of the 10-day prophylaxis 
period, whichever was later. After the prophylaxis 
period, a telephone questionnaire was adminis-
tered to personnel who had left camp before the 
screening was completed.
Molecular Diagnosis and Sequencing
Nasopharyngeal swabs were collected, resuspend-
ed in 2.0 ml of viral-transport medium, and sent 
for RT-PCR testing, all within a 24-hour period. The 
RT-PCR assay involved protocols with the swine 
H1 forward–reverse primer set and probe.18 Posi-
tive samples with sufficient RNA underwent whole-
genome sequencing according to a previously re-
ported approach.19 The resulting sequences were 
used to generate phylogenetic trees with the use 
of Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis 4 soft-
ware.20 All sequenced samples were screened for 
known and suspected mutations that would con-
fer oseltamivir resistance, including the H274Y 
mutation. Additional methods are described in the 
Supplementary Appendix (available with the full 
text of this article at NEJM.org).
Statistical Analysis
Following the statistical argument of Cauchemez 
and col leagues,21 we assumed that each case of 
2009 H1N1 influenza leads to new cases, distrib-
uted as a Poisson variate with a mean of λ or λθ 
in the absence or presence of intervention, re-
spectively, as well as a specific form for the gen-
eration interval. The λ variable represents the re-
productive number (the mean number of new cases 
attributable to the index case) in the absence of 
intervention, and λθ the reproductive number af-
ter intervention. Analysis was performed accord-
ing to the Bayesian paradigm,22 and with the use 
of the statistical programming language R.23 The 
Supplementary Appendix describes that analy sis 
as well as the methods used to quantify the 
strength of the intervention effect, obtain credi-
ble intervals, and evaluate the hypothesis of a re-
duction in infection rates after intervention (i.e., 
θ<1). For measures of statistical significance, we 
report the posterior hypothesis probabilities as 
described in the Supplementary Appendix.
R esult s
A total of 82 confirmed cases of infection with the 
2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus were 
identified during the four outbreaks (Table 1).
Outbreak 1
From June 21 to 22, 2009, four personnel (B, C, 
E, and F in Fig. 1) tested positive for 2009 H1N1 
influenza. Three (B, E, and F) had performed over-
night guard duty together on June 18, 2009. Four 
more (A, G, H, and I) were confirmed to be infect-
ed during initial investigations. The remaining 
208 coworkers were given oseltamivir prophylaxis; 
of these, 81 were identified as close contacts and 
were quarantined at home. During the outbreak, 
three more personnel tested positive, of whom two 
(D and J) had not been initially identified as close 
contacts. Of the remaining 205 personnel, 185 
(90.2%) completed the course of prophylaxis. Four-
teen personnel reported minor respiratory symp-
toms; 11 tested negative for 2009 H1N1 influenza 
and 3 were not tested. The other personnel contin-
ued working in the camp, and none tested posi-
tive, as assessed by testing three consecutive na-
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sopharyngeal swabs obtained over a 1-week period. 
Overall, 11 of the 216 personnel (5.1%) were in-
fected (Fig. 1).
Outbreak 2
In a military medical center, 6 of 47 health care 
workers tested positive from June 24 to 25, 2009. 
Because health care workers were essential for the 
medical center to function, oseltamivir prophy-
laxis was administered to the remaining 41 per-
sonnel, who continued to work while wearing per-
sonal protective equipment (N95 mask, gloves, 
gown, and cap). All 41 health care workers com-
pleted the prophylaxis, and none had evidence of 
infection on testing of three consecutive nasopha-
ryngeal swabs obtained over a 1-week period.
Outbreak 3
On June 23, 2009, the index patient presented with 
influenza-like illness and tested positive. On June 
20, 2009, he had visited a nightclub in Singapore 
(where there was a separate outbreak).24 One oth-
er asymptomatic case in the unit was confirmed 
during initial investigations. The remaining 217 
personnel in the unit were immediately started 
on prophylaxis, and active surveillance was per-
formed, consisting of testing of two nasopharyn-
geal swabs obtained over a 3-day period. None 
tested positive. After prophylaxis, telephone sur-
veillance was performed, with 193 of the 217 per-
sonnel (88.9%) successfully contacted; 186 of 193 
(96.4%) had completed the prophylaxis. Only one 
soldier reported fever; he tested negative.
Outbreak 4
A unit of 693 army-reserve personnel entered the 
camp from the community on June 22, 2009, for 
5 days of training. From June 25 to 26, a total of 
59 personnel presented with fever and respiratory 
symptoms and tested positive. The index patient 
Table 1. Summary of the Four Outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 Influenza and Efficacy of Oseltamivir Prophylaxis and Other Interventions.*
Variable Total Outbreak 1 Outbreak 2 Outbreak 3 Outbreak 4
Total no. of personnel 1175 216 47 219 693
Confirmed cases — no. (%) 82 (7.0) 11 (5.1) 6 (12.8) 2 (0.9) 63 (9.1)
Before intervention — no. (%) 75 (6.4) 8 (3.7) 6 (12.8) 2 (0.9) 59 (8.5)
After intervention — no. (%) 7 (0.6) 3 (1.4) 0 0 4 (0.6)
Posterior hypothesis probability <0.001 0.11 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Symptomatic personnel (excluding confirmed cases)
Tested and negative — no. (%) 23 (2.0) 11 (5.1) 0 1 (0.5) 11 (1.6)
Not tested — no. (%) 47 (4.0) 3 (1.4) 0 4 (1.8) 40 (5.8)
Mild respiratory symptoms only 40 (3.4) 1 (0.5) 0 4 (1.8) 35 (5.1)
Reported fever with respiratory symptoms 7 (0.6) 2 (0.9) 0 0 5 (0.7)
Completion of oseltamivir prophylaxis — no./total no. 
(%)†
929/974 (95.4) 185/205 (90.2) 41/41 (100) 186/193 (96.4) 517/535 (96.6)
Confirmed cases and symptomatic personnel who 
were not tested‡
Total — no./total no. 115/1161 14/216 6/47 5/218 90/680
Before intervention — no./total no. (%) 85/1161 (7.3) 10/216 (4.6) 6/47 (12.8) 3/218 (1.4) 66/680 (9.7)
After intervention — no./total no. (%) 30/1076 (2.8) 4/206 (1.9) 0 2/215 (0.9) 24/614 (3.9)
Posterior hypothesis probability <0.001 0.02 <0.001 0.09 <0.001
* The posterior hypothesis probabilities were calculated for the comparison of the incidence of infection before intervention and after inter-
vention, as described in the Supplementary Appendix.
† The number of subjects who completed the oseltamivir prophylaxis regimen excludes those with confirmed infections and those who could 
not be contacted.
‡ The number of confirmed cases and symptomatic personnel who were not tested excludes 14 symptomatic personnel who could not re-
member the date of onset of their illness. The percentage of confirmed cases and symptomatic personnel who were not tested before inter-
vention is based on the total number with data; the percentage after intervention is based on the total number with data minus the number 
identified before intervention.
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could not be conclusively identified. Prophylaxis 
was begun in the remaining 634 personnel, who 
were given home leave after completion of train-
ing on June 26. They were followed by means of 
telephone surveillance. Throughout the outbreak 
period, a total of 63 personnel (9.1%) had con-
firmed infection (Fig. 2). After prophylaxis was 
completed, the remaining 630 unaffected person-
nel were surveyed by means of telephone; 535 
(84.9%) responded, of whom 517 (96.6%) reported 
having completed the prophylaxis. A total of 41 
respondents reported having respiratory symp-
toms, and 10 reported having fever with respira-
tory symptoms. Of these personnel, six and five, 
respectively, were tested; all tests were negative.
Molecular Sequencing
The use of whole-genome sequencing allowed for 
a molecular epidemiologic analysis, as previously 
described.25 Whole-genome sequences were used 
to identify the relatedness of the isolated viruses 
and to suggest clusters of transmission to further 
describe the conditions of the outbreak (Fig. 3).
Each of the four outbreaks formed a distinct 
cluster, with the closest international strains de-
rived from the New York lineage A/New York/18/
2009(H1N1). Outbreak 4 comprised two viral clus-
ters, one New York–like and the other similar to 
the Singapore local-nightclub cluster24; strains 
isolated during the other outbreaks matched Sin-
gapore strains closely. The whole-genome se-
quences of viruses from outbreak 2 were tightly 
clustered, suggesting a single causal virus, where-
as the local components of outbreaks 1, 3, and 
4 were from introductions of highly related Sin-
gapore strains, not repeated introductions of dis-
tinct viruses. The molecular evidence strongly 
supports the results of our epidemiologic inves-
tigation, which bear out the premise that the out-
breaks consisted of transmitted cases of infec-
tion rather than unrelated cases.
All seven confirmed cases with an onset after 
oseltamivir prophylaxis occurred within 4 days 
after the intervention. The affected patients had 
complied with the prophylaxis; at the time of in-
fection, they were switched to a treatment dose. 
In six of the seven cases, there was sufficient ge-
netic material for sequencing. None of the se-
quenced samples (37 in total, including these 6) 
had any known or suspected mutations that might 
have conferred resistance to oseltamivir (includ-
ing the H274Y mutation).
Rates of Infection and Efficacy 
of Interventions
The overall proportion of personnel with infection 
before the oseltamivir prophylaxis and the other 
interventions were instituted was 6.4% across all 
four military units (Table 1). After prophylaxis 
was begun, in combination with home leave co-
ordination of schedules to avoid contact among 
the units at the camp, seven more cases were con-
firmed (0.6% of the study population). After in-
tervention, the infection rate was reduced to 5.9% 
of the original rate (95% credible interval, 2.5 to 
10.9), (posterior hypothesis probability, <0.001).
Guided by the phylogenetic analyses, we used 
mathematical modeling to investigate the effect of 
the interventions on the course of the outbreaks. 
If we considered only confirmed cases, the global 
estimate of the reproductive number before inter-
vention was 1.91 (95% credible interval, 1.50 to 
2.36). There was a significant reduction in the 
reproductive number after intervention, to 0.11 
(95% credible interval, 0.05 to 0.20) (posterior hy-
pothesis probability, <0.001). If untested, symp-
tomatic cases were included, the reproductive 
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Figure 1. Timing of Events and Cases during Outbreak 1, According to 
Date of Onset of Influenza.
Generations 1 and 2 are the first and second generations, respectively, 
of 2009 H1N1 influenza spread from the three presumed index cases. 
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number before the interventions was 1.85 (95% 
credible interval, 1.48 to 2.24), with a significant 
reduction after intervention, to 0.28 (95% credible 
interval, 0.20 to 0.38) (posterior hypothesis prob-
ability, <0.001).
The rate of infection was clearly reduced as 
a result of interventions in outbreaks 2, 3, and 
4 (Table 1). In outbreak 4, ring prophylaxis co-
incided with the sending home of personnel; 
thus, to test the effectiveness of prophylaxis, we 
projected the distribution of one further genera-
tion of cases, using the posterior mean of the re-
productive number during the preintervention pe-
riod (Fig. 2). The two distributions we estimated 
represent what we would expect if the apparent 
efficacy of the interventions was due to chance 
alone or due to the isolation measures, not the 
oseltamivir prophylaxis. The large discrepancy be-
tween these distributions and the observed tra-
jectory of the epidemic strongly suggests that the 
sharp drop in rate of infection was due to prophy-
laxis, which reduced the transmission of the virus, 
as well as isolation (rather than isolation alone).
Side Effects of Oseltamivir
We surveyed a total of 816 personnel for side ef-
fects of oseltamivir prophylaxis. In all, 63 (7.7%) 
reported mild, nonrespiratory symptoms (Table 2). 
No neuropsychiatric events or severe adverse 
events were reported.
Discussion
Many essential services are provided by persons 
who work in semiclosed or closed environments 
where influenza outbreaks can be rapid and 
severe.6,26 In an influenza outbreak among Tai-
wanese military recruits, the rate of infection was 
57.7%27; an influenza A (H3N2) outbreak on a U.S. 
Navy ship had an infection rate of 42%.28 High 
rates of infection are also reported at schools, 
which are similarly enclosed. One boarding school 
had 56 cases (in 6.5% of the population) a week 
after the index case occurred,29 and another had 
an overall rate of infection of 71%.30 During a New 
York City school outbreak of the 2009 pandemic 
influenza A (H1N1) virus, 35% of students report-
ed symptoms of influenza-like illness.31 In our 
study, during outbreak 4, 59 cases occurred with-
in 4 days after the first contact with the index 
patient.
Two modeling studies of the containment of 
pandemic epicenters, although not specifically 
based on closed communities, have predicted the 
effectiveness of ring prophylaxis.4,5 The effective-
ness of antiviral prophylaxis has not been well 
documented in outbreak situations outside the 
household setting.32 The use of postexposure pro-
phylaxis with oseltamivir in close household con-
tacts of patients with seasonal influenza resulted 
in protective efficacies of 68%7 and 89%33 against 
clinically diagnosed influenza. Early prophylaxis 
with amantadine also reduced the incidence of 
influenza, and its associated mortality rate, in 
outbreaks at long-term care facilities.34
For the 2009 influenza pandemic, H1N1 ob-
servations suggest that antiviral prophylaxis ad-
ministered in contacts within households, schools, 
and workplaces is effective in slowing transmis-
sion.35 In the present study, we have shown that 
ring prophylaxis with oseltamivir given after ex-
posure in military camps, including a health care 
setting, was effective, allowing training and op-
erations to continue while substantially reducing 
the risk of further generations of cases during 
prophylaxis. The settings studied have the poten-
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Figure 2. Epidemiologic Data and Model Projections for Outbreak 4,  
According to Date of Onset of Influenza.
The numbers of cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza during outbreak 4 are 
shown. Also shown (as circles) are predicted numbers of cases on the basis 
of assumptions that the apparent effect of the interventions was due to ei-
ther chance alone (“no control”) or to the release of the personnel to home 
(“home leave only”), rather than to the oseltamivir prophylaxis. I bars indi-
cate 95% credible intervals of the predicted values.
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of Whole-Genome Sequencing.
Numbers in parentheses indicate the identifier of the substrain; the letters refer to the patient identifiers used in 
Figure 1. Strains from each outbreak are denoted in a unique color. Numbers at each node in the tree indicate the 
bootstrap value (reflecting the robustness of the evidence supporting the clade of which that node is the root). The 
scale bar denotes the number of DNA base substitutions (a measure of evolutionary divergence).
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at LONDON SCH HYGIENE & TROPICAL MED on October 13, 2016. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
Ring Prophylaxis for 2009 H1N1 Influenza Outbreaks
n engl j med 362;23 nejm.org june 10, 2010 2173
tial for intense transmission and are similar to 
environments such as hospital wards, boarding 
schools and other schools, and long-term care 
facilities. The initial response to outbreak 1 also 
reflects the limitations of quarantining only people 
considered to be close contacts of an affected pa-
tient, since some cases were identified in patients 
who were contacts, but not close contacts as de-
fined by the Singapore Ministry of Health. Ring 
prophylaxis, based on spatial proximity, was more 
effective in controlling the spread of disease than 
was an exclusive focus on close contacts.
The pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine is now 
available36; however, antiviral prophylaxis may be 
considered as an additional strategy in reducing 
the pandemic’s effects, especially in areas in which 
the supply of vaccine is limited. Furthermore, this 
strategy may be important in future epidemics and 
pandemics, either before vaccines are available or 
when there is a poor match between the vaccine 
and circulating strains.
The threshold for initiating neuraminidase-
inhibitor prophylaxis has not been well defined. 
For outbreaks 1, 2, and 3 in our study, prophylaxis 
was initiated early and was followed by rapid ces-
sation of the outbreak. This was possible because 
of rapid detection through health education, sur-
veillance through daily measurement of tempera-
ture and monitoring of symptoms, and laboratory 
testing. Although outbreak 4 was not detected 
early, postexposure prophylaxis was effective in 
breaking the chain of transmission and probably 
helped prevent a higher rate of infection.
Study limitations include the facts that the data 
were observational and that multiple interven-
tions were applied simultaneously. The relative 
strength of the nonpharmaceutical interventions 
as compared with prophylaxis could only be in-
ferred through modeling. However, it would have 
been difficult to use prophylaxis as the sole con-
trol measure, owing to external pressure to do 
everything possible to halt transmission and the 
spontaneous social-distancing measures people 
take. Although the best efforts were made to en-
sure consistency of the data collection and use of 
interventions across the four outbreaks, local cir-
cumstances influenced the study activities and 
should be considered part of any investigation of 
outbreaks. In addition, monitoring data were in-
complete for some outbreaks, because personnel 
completed their training and were given home 
leave; we subsequently performed telephone sur-
veillance instead to obtain as much information as 
possible.
The use of oseltamivir prophylaxis as a con-
tainment measure may be limited to semiclosed 
or closed communities, since transmission in 
communities in the general population may sub-
sequently lead to further outbreaks. In the board-
ing school where the use of amantadine prophy-
laxis significantly reduced the number of influenza 
cases, the number of cases increased after the 
prophylaxis was stopped.29 However, the overall 
rate of infection was significantly lower than ex-
pected, and cases were spread out over time, re-
ducing the peak rate of absenteeism.
Our experience provides evidence that early case 
detection and the use of antiviral ring prophy-
laxis effectively truncate the spread of infection 
during an epidemic, giving empirical support to 
theoretical mathematical models. Aggressive pro-
phylaxis may be justifiable to provide protection 
from an influenza strain that causes severe dis-
ease or to protect vulnerable populations such as 
frail or elderly residents of long-term care facili-
ties or persons in closed or semiclosed environ-
ments such as schools, prisons, and military 
camps. Finally, containing the pandemic’s spread 
may postpone the onset of substantial illness and 
distribute temporally the burden on the health care 
system until other control measures, such as vac-
cine, become available.
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Table 2. Side Effects of Oseltamivir Prophylaxis.
Side Effect
Personnel 
(N = 816)
no. (%)
Diarrhea 14 (1.7)
Headache 9 (1.1)
Nausea or vomiting 22 (2.7)
Dizziness 5 (0.6)
Epigastric pain 4 (0.5)
Drowsiness 8 (1.0)
Mild allergic reaction (rash) 6 (0.7)
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